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Infrastructure Planning in Rural Massachusetts
Jeanne H. Armstrong, Meir Gross, John R. Mullin and Robert D. Yaro
Abstract – This paper describes the importance of understanding and dealing with the problems of
infrastructure planning and maintenance in rural communities. Infrastructure is defined to include roads,
bridges, water and wastewater collection and treatment systems, and public buildings and capital
equipment. The authors base their findings primarily on the experience of communities in Massachusetts,
but these findings are readily applied to the situation of rural communities elsewhere in the U.S.A. and
other developed countries. Three major conclusions are presented in the paper: the need for rural
communities to develop long-range plans for infrastructure maintenance and finance; the need to develop
effective local institutions to assume this responsibility, and the importance of managing growth in fastgrowing rural areas in order to minimize the need for major expansion of infrastructure systems.

Introduction
This paper presents the results of a study of rural infrastructure problems in
Massachusetts. While the laboratory was one State in the U.S.A., the results are
applicable to situations in mature regions of many developed countries, where tight
budgets and decaying infrastructure often go hand in hand. To us, infrastructure means
the system of roads, sewers, water lines, electrical lines and structures that are under
municipal control.1
The findings of this study will be relevant to other mature industrial regions in the
U.S.A. and other developed countries now experiencing the need for replacement of
infrastructure. The deterioration of infrastructure has been discussed extensively in the
professional, academic and popular literature in the U.S.A., U.K. and other countries,2
and therefore the experience in Massachusetts should be of interest to officials and
academics dealing with this problem.
This paper will discuss, first, the problems of rapid growth, fiscal austerity, and
administrative lack of information that have led to the decline of rural infrastructure.
Second, it will delineate possible solutions to these problems. In both sections, examples
based on the experience of rural communities in Massachusetts will serve as illustrations.
Finally, this paper will draw the connection between infrastructure planning and
growth management that can and must be made if rural areas are to cope with both issues.
The study area
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a small State with remarkable cultural
and geographic diversity. Its 7825 square miles are divided into 312 towns and 39 cities.
Mountains, forests and farmland and 1200 miles of coastline divide the State into several
distinct geographic regions.3
Sixty per cent of the State’s population lives in the 101 cities and towns of
metropolitan Boston. On the coast and in the western mountains, rural communities

struggle to attract, and then cope with, recreational development and tourism. Between
these extremes lie the more typically patterned communities – small central cities with
their suburban rings and out-lying rural towns.
Massachusetts’ political system is marked by strong State and local governments,
with a decidedly weak county system. Local control has been fiercely protected for 350
years and most communities – even some that have grown into cities – maintain the town
meeting form of government, whereby all voting residents of the community serve as its
legislative body. Local governments tend to be headed by non-professional (and often
volunteer, unpaid) elected executives; less than 15% of Massachusetts’ local
governments are headed by professional town or city managers.4 Under this system, parttime elected ‘boards of selectmen’ serve as the executive branch of town governments.
Regional identification, whether among the people of the Berkshire Hills in the west or
those on Cape Cod on the south-east coast, often seems stronger than any loyalty to the
Commonwealth as a whole. This spirit of autonomism, as will be suggested later,
strongly affects infrastructure problems in the State.
The rural infrastructure problem: cases and causes
Growth patterns
Much of Massachusetts’ infrastructure is a product of an industrial development
and settlement pattern that developed in the last half of the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Early in that period, more than 30 mill cities sprung up throughout the State, generally
near sources of water power or ports of entry. Many of these cities were planned
industrial cities with sophisticated systems of water supply, sewage collection,
transportation, and power distribution.5
It should also be noted that the problems of rural infrastructure in some
Massachusetts communities closely parallel those of the Commonwealth’s urban regions
(as well as those of other States and industrial countries) given the age of the
infrastructure present in these older mill towns.
By the 1950s and 1960s, however, most of these cities were experiencing severe
economic decline, and their infrastructure was becoming outmoded and deteriorated.
During this period, a major population shift into suburban areas brought with it political
pressures for new highways, sewer and water systems and other infrastructure
development.6
Like most other regions in the country, Massachusetts experienced rapid rural
growth during the period 1970-1980, with non-metropolitan areas growing 19% at a time
when metropolitan areas of the Commonwealth were slowly losing population. These
trends have continued since 1980, with rural areas increasing in population by 5%, while
metropolitan areas increased by less than 1%. In many towns on the exurban fringes of
Boston and in rural south-eastern Massachusetts, growth rates of 15% per year are not

uncommon, bringing with them pressures for rapid development of infrastructure
(Duncan, quoted in Mullin and Thomas, 1985, pp. 119-164).
Given the Commonwealth’s booming economy (driven by strong high-technology
and service sectors), preferences for rural living, revolutions in communications and
long-distance commuting, and major new industrial development on the fringes of
metropolitan areas (readily accessible to most rural areas of Massachusetts), it is expected
that growth in rural areas and the need for consequent infrastructure development will
continue for the foreseeable future.7
At the same time, it should be noted that the sprawling, low-density land use
patterns occurring in many rural areas, by requiring longer roads and utility lines between
structures, make for high infrastructure development costs.
Public attitudes
The pressures created by Massachusetts’ growth patterns are worsened by public
attitudes wrought during the fiscal crises of the 1970s. Prior to the beginning of the
current high-technology boom, the State was experiencing severe decline in its older,
mostly nondurable goods-based manufacturing economy, at the same time that its defense
and aerospace industries were also experiencing federal cutbacks. By 1975, the State was
functionally bankrupt, the cost of local services was among the highest in the nation, and
the overwhelming dependence on the property tax for local revenues had fostered the
nickname ‘Taxachusetts’ (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982).
Then, as now, bonds constituted the long-term debt of municipalities. Cities and
towns, upon determining the need for infrastructure improvements, entered the bond
market where, in return for investor’s capital, they pledged their faith and credit to pay
back the debt with interest over a period of 20-30 years. The rationale for this approach
was to keep the tax rate as low as possible, and to pay for capital improvements over the
life of these improvements.
Such long-term debt, however, became increasingly unpopular in the face of more
immediate budgetary problems. The amount of money spent on infrastructure continued
to decline.
In 1980 the Commonwealth’s voters enacted by referendum a rate-capping law
modeled after California’s Proposition 13. Popularly known as Proposition 2 ½, this law
limited local property tax rates to 3.5% of market value. Proposition 2 ½ gave all
communities 3 years to reduce tax levels to the 2.5% level, and permitted increases in
property taxes of only 2 ½% per year thereafter. The citizens of Massachusetts were
concerned that their property tax payments were too high relative to the services they
were receiving and relative to taxes in the rest of the nation. After the tax cap was
passed, tax payments became quite moderate compared to other States. Once
communities reach the 2.5% limit, however, the only way to raise additional property tax

money is through new development, or improvements to existing structures (see Suskind,
1983).
With this as background, one can perhaps more readily understand the desire to
control spending and focus solely on ‘essentials’. Essentials have not, and to a large
degree still do not, include maintaining infrastructure.
The problem of spending
Massachusetts’ economy suffered dramatically during the 1970s. With the end of
the Viet Nam War came a phasing down of defense industries; with cutbacks in the
national space program space-related firms laid off thousands of workers. Thousands of
military-related jobs at armories, airbases and army bases were lost. All of this occurred
while mature industries were in decline, which combined with a series of national
economic recessions to create a fiscal crisis for State government.8
From this climate emerged a deeply-ingrained reluctance to spend. Since the
mid-1970s local municipalities have continued to cut back on infrastructure maintenance
and replacement. Massachusetts, in adjusted dollars, spent 20% less on infrastructure in
1979-81 than in 1974-76. Significantly, 1975 and 1976 were especially bad years for the
State economy. What these figures show is that the reluctance to invest in infrastructure
is not a new phenomenon. Rather, communities began to shift to other priorities ten
years ago.9
Proposition 2 ½ contributed significantly to the failure of spending to keep pace
with infrastructure needs. A review of State figures shows that the impact was most
severe in terms of capital expenditures – although maintenance was cut as well. Needed
(and desired) roads, sewer and water system expansions and school proposals were
postponed or dropped. Street maintenance programs, which had been curtailed long
before Proposition 2 ½ was passed, were further reduced (see Armstrong et al., 1985).
Proposition 2 ½ virtually eliminated the remaining capital improvement planning
efforts at the local level. It should also be noted that the tax cap was put in place at the
same time that the Federal Government was cutting back on its grants to local
communities for infrastructure assistance.10 The combination forced communities to live
with what they had whether it was well or poorly maintained.
A look at one city’s investment in parks equipment will show the scope of the
problem. In 1968, the city of Chicopee floated a bond to bring all of its equipment up to
date. Since that time, three major firms left the city, a nearby military base closed and
Proposition 2 ½ reduced money available for the local budget. In 1982, the city closed
much of its parks programs, cut back its staff and junked much of its equipment – it was
simply beyond repair. The problem became so severe that in 1983 the parks department
staff, which also did cemetery maintenance, was forced to hand-dig graves. Three years
later, the city has not replaced its equipment. All of this occurred in a city with a sound
fiscal standing, a good bond rating and relatively few unemployed. There was clearly no

reason to allow this equipment to deteriorate, other than a reluctance to invest in the
city’s future capital needs (Mullin, 1983).
This study identified this attitude in many of the communities examined. Local
communities have so little confidence in the health of the economy that they are
unwilling to make large financial commitments. Thus, expenditures are largely shortterm and repair-oriented rather than maintenance- or enhancement-oriented.
In reality, most communities can afford to invest in infrastructure. Over the past
two decades Massachusetts cities and towns have been steadily decreasing their longterm debts. The net result is that the debt of these cities and towns is well below the
national average and likely to move even lower as money borrowed in the 1960s is
repaid. This means that the ability to raise funds is not a major problem from the
standpoint of debt but it is a problem politically.11
More and more, local officials appear to be meeting their constituents’ demands
for sound fiscal planning by ignoring expensive, if necessary, infrastructural
improvements. Forms of infrastructure that cannot be seen – e.g. water, sewer and other
utility lines, and drainage systems – result in little public awareness of political benefits
to elected officials, and tend therefore to receive a low priority when limited available
funds are allocated.12
Perhaps more importantly, approximately one-third of Massachusetts’ towns,
mostly in rural areas, have no bond rating from Moody’s, have no bond counsel and no
underwriting house. Moody’s Investment Service is a New-York-based nation-wide
investment analysis firm that provides detailed evaluation of the capabilities of cities and
towns to pay back bonds. Generally, a well-governed, economically healthy, low-debted
city will have a high rating. A city with questionable government practices, a weak
economic base and high debt will, on the other hand, score quite low. This means that
these communities, before even entering the market, must put time, effort and money into
the process. Because the overwhelming majority of these towns rely on non-professional
executives and volunteers, the more sophisticated financing options are rarely taken.
This phenomenon is illustrated by the example of a small Berkshire County
community which is now considering whether to ‘float’ a bond for needed infrastructure
improvements. The cost of preparing for the bond issue (of approximately $1,300,000)
has been estimated at more than $10,000. The figure itself may seem slight, but in a town
with no surplus funds, and where taxes cannot be raised further, it means that something
else must be cut. Often in town meetings, where budgetary decisions are made, the
$10,000 will be compared to the cost of a needed service such as a teacher’s salary. The
net effect is that bonds are rarely floated in small, rural towns (interview with J. De Rosa,
Co-Chairperson, Governor’s Task Force on Economic Development in the Northern
Berkshires, 20 May 1985; see also Armstrong et al., 1986b).

The problem of management
With the exception of northern Maine, all of New England is divided into political
subdivisions, which in many cases for more than 350 years have been responsible for
delivery of nearly all public services. Unlike the rest of the country, county government
and regional planning have never taken root in Massachusetts and elsewhere in the
region, and annexation of urbanizing areas is unheard of. For these reasons, in most of
rural New England public services are the responsibility of town governments led by
part-time, volunteer officials. The local legislative bodies – town meetings – get together
but once a year, in a not always well-organized fashion, to pass budgets and adopt
necessary bylaws.
Although this system has worked well for a long time, the governments of fastgrowing rural communities are besieged by the combined pressures of expanding
workloads, State and Federal red tape, and the need to develop roads, water and sewer
systems and other services for new residents, many of whom insist on services they
received in their former urban and suburban hometowns. Volunteers simply cannot keep
up with these demands. In most Massachusetts towns, for example, subdivision bylaws
exist stating the conditions under which a developer can build in a particular area.
Detailed site plans must be submitted and approved by the town before any work can be
started. This creates so much work for the town, however, that little time remains to do
strategic planning. Likewise, conservation commissions (local bodies created by State
law, to plan for conservation of each town’s natural resources), are so busy monitoring
development proposals that they have no time for open-space planning or other
conservation efforts.13
There are more than 130 towns in Massachusetts with no full-time administrators.
With only part-time, voluntary leadership, little innovation, day-to-day management, or
even grant writing is likely to occur. The small town of Pelham, in western
Massachusetts, is an excellent example: the community has had a number of serious
infrastructure needs, including deteriorating roads, an open-air road salt storage site
which was polluting local water supplies, and a much needed new municipal building.
While grants were (and are) available to handle all three problems, it took more than five
years for volunteers to handle just the first two while each year the problems become
more difficult to correct. The third problem has only recently been addressed, at a time
when the granting agency is cutting back on its programs.
Division of responsibilities for infrastructure among several town departments is
common, and it exacerbates the problems of voluntary, non-professional and
decentralized management. Local highways are the responsibility of town public works
departments, while water and sewer systems are controlled by local, yet separate water
and sewer departments each under the supervision of separate appointed boards made up
of citizen volunteers. Each department maintains its own systems according to its own
methods and standards. The net result is that it is difficult to monitor, evaluate and
control the various agencies as they use and maintain the systems and facilities. Why

does a truck last twice as long in one department then another, given equal use and age?
The answer is inevitably tied to differing maintenance standards.
Each department has the responsibility of preparing an annual budget covering its
annual operating expenses. Typically, the Board of Selectmen (the town’s ‘executive’)
will demand a budget with an increase of no more than 4%, including salary raises. The
department heads follow directions and, fully realizing there is no money for additional
expenditures ignore any infrastructural improvements beyond the most critical of
emergencies. Once the budget is resolved and if the town is still below its tax cap
maximum, it may then provide some funds for capital improvements.
One of the great ironies of the present situation is that despite rapid growth in
rural areas, a number of small cities located in rural regions continue to lag in
employment, income and other indices of economic well being. Possessed with a rich
architectural and cultural heritage, and a well-developed infrastructure system, each of
these communities has the potential to serve as a magnet for new development in its
region. In 1975, the Government of Massachusetts began to encourage economic
development in these cities. Several such efforts continue but no systematic effort is in
place to lessen the pressure of development on rural or exurban areas by encouraging
development in the cities which have the necessary infrastructure and the willingness to
accommodate new development.
Problems caused by State infrastructure planning efforts
Beginning in the 1970s, Massachusetts’ State Government became increasingly
and directly involved in many aspects of local decision-making. Nowhere was this more
evident than in terms of infrastructure development. At present there are 24 Statesupported and Federal local aid programs that address capital improvement needs.
However, with the exception of aid for water supply systems, these State and Federal
programs are heavily weighted toward supporting new construction rather than upgrading
and maintaining existing systems.14 Several problems have emerged from these State and
Federal programs.
First, local planners tend to think of investment needs in terms of how to obtain
State funds. Local objectives are shaped, not by careful consideration and community
consensus regarding the long-term future of the town, rather by what the State will
finance. Local officials, often citizens’ committees, are caught up in the grant-writing
cycle, chasing after doubtful funding for capital expenditures, the actual needs for which
the citizens have not completely considered. Indeed, in many rural towns, part of the
problem rests with the town planner, or grantsperson, who is under considerable pressure
to bring dollars into the community. The amount of money becomes more important than
the actual need for which it is intended.
Most governmental grants-in-aid for infrastructure improvements (among others)
come to communities either on an entitlement basis (the communities get them
automatically) or on a discretionary basis (they must apply for the funds). Usually, the

smaller the community, the less likely it will be to be eligible for entitlement funds. Left
to compete for discretionary funds, however, rural towns often lack that expertise to
negotiate programs created by more sophisticated urban administrators. Nor can they
afford to hire more people to do it for them. In short, discretionary grants go to the
professionally-run, well-financed towns. They do not go to small, volunteer-run
communities.
The third problem with State infrastructure programs is that changes in the
formulas that determine State aid make it virtually impossible for towns to budget over
time. A formula can be base, for example, on population, unemployment, age of housing,
percentage of people on welfare or, among others, the number of school-age children. It
can even be a combination of factors. The problem is that the legislature has constantly
tinkered with the formula to the point that it is impossible to predict from year to year
how much State aid will be given to a particular community. The net effect is that the
funds go to short-term projects free from long-term commitments.
Finally, the State will often provide assistance to a community only if it meets
conditions that have nothing to do with the grant in question. For example, each city and
town, in order to be eligible for State grants must submit a Fair Housing Plan. The plan
must show that the community is making a good faith effort to house the region’s poor.
The town of Hadley in the Connecticut River Valley recently applied for a grant to
restore its historic town common and make infrastructural improvements. From all
accounts, the town had met the letter and spirit of the rules for entry and ranked high
enough to gain the funds on the rating scheme prepared by the professional staff.
However, since it did not have its Fair Housing Plan in order, the grant was denied. One
can argue the merits of such an approach. The net result however is the loss of a grant
designed to meet a local need.
Summary of problems
When combined with the already urgent requirements for reconstruction of urban
infrastructure, the phenomenon of rapid rural growth will make the infrastructure needs
of the Commonwealth’s rural areas as compelling in the 1980s and 1990s as were the
needs of suburban areas in the 1950s and 1960s.
In the light of the dearth of public support for infrastructure investments, the lack
of professional management in town government, and the financial constraints imposed
on communities by Proposition 2 ½ and expected cutbacks in Federal aid, rural
communities will be compelled to find new ways to design, finance and manage
infrastructure improvements. State and local governments must create growth
management efforts to foster those development patterns that minimize expensive
infrastructure investments.
The remainder of this paper will outline some of the options available to local and
state officials which could achieve these objectives.

The rural infrastructure problem: towards a solution
Philosophical changes
The first step in solving Massachusetts’ infrastructure dilemma is a change in the
basic approach to infrastructure planning by local governments.
Communities as diverse as Ramapo, New York, Petaluma, California, Boulder,
Colorado, and Montgomery County, Maryland have made infrastructure plans an integral
part of comprehensive plans to manage rapid suburban and exurban growth.15 Such plans
can be employed to control the costs and timing of infrastructure improvements by:
placing water and sewer lines, roads and other improvements only where growth is
desired; making decisions about the size and capacity of improvements in the light of
growth plans for areas to be served by those improvements; making land-use decisions
based on the carrying capacity of underlying natural systems, e.g. subsurface hydrology,
surface drainage and floodplains, and the ability of soils to handle anticipated septic
loads. If Massachusetts communities were to adopt this approach to infrastructure
planning, they could improve the quality of both their growth management and
infrastructure planning. Growing rural communities, for example, could determine
development locations and densities that would be consistent with the availability of
groundwater and the ability of soils to handle septic loads. In this way, they could
accommodate growth, and still preclude the need for expensive municipal water supply
and wastewater collection and treatment facilities. This strategy will become
increasingly attractive as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) grants for
water supply and wastewater treatment facilities are phased out. In areas such as Cape
Cod, which is dependent on a sole-source aquifer for all its potable water, this approach
could mean the difference between sustainable development and the destruction of the
natural system upon which the habitability of the region is based.16
Design and engineering changes
One way of reducing the costs of necessary infrastructure improvements will be to
develop new design and engineering standards for public improvements which meet the
needs of rural communities.
In the area of rural roadway design, for example, adherence to design standards of
the American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
results in roads which are incompatible with rural landscapes and far more costly to
construct than necessary.
The recent proposal to realign several miles of Route 2 through the Wendell State
Forest in western Massachusetts illustrates the point. AASHTO standards for the
proposed road would require 14-ft travel lanes, paved shoulders and deceleration lanes,
grades and sight lines allowing 55 mph travel and reconfiguration of slopes and
vegetation to allow winter sunlight onto the roadway to reduce icing. Also required
would be the usual collection of expensive safety features including reinforced concrete

safety barriers (known as ‘Jersey Barriers’), and steel ribbon guardrails. The resulting
design yields a 600-ft wide right-of-way and massive destruction of State forest land and
produces construction costs of several million dollars per mile. All this ‘over design’
results in a realigned two-lane roadway yielding a 59-second reduction in travel time
when compared to the existing alignment.
Reevaluation of such excessive and inappropriate Federal and State highway
design standards could yield huge savings in both natural and financial resources. On the
local level, subdivision bylaws often include excessive design standards for roadways,
drainage, lighting, underground utilities and other public improvements that cost
developers and homebuyers more in the short run, and cost communities more in
maintenance and replacement expenses in the long run. This has occurred in some
instances in rural Massachusetts towns which adopted ‘carbon copy’ subdivision bylaws,
literally copied by consultants or town officials from other, often more urban, community
bylaws.
In the central Massachusetts town of Monson, for example, the subdivision bylaw
adopted by the town several years ago includes grading requirements for roadways which
simply cannot be met in this hilly town without creating a major quarry or sand removal
operation at the site of each new subdivision road. When combined with excessive
roadway widths, drainage, lighting, sidewalk, and underground utility requirements, such
bylaws can increase the infrastructure costs to new residents by several thousand dollars
per housing unit.
The resulting subdivisions are so costly, in fact, that in rural towns like Monson
few subdivisions are built. Instead, development spreads up and down existing roads in
frontage lots, requiring longer utility lines and damaging the visual character of the
community.
For this reason, both State and Federal agencies should review development
standards for appropriateness to rural areas, and where applicable, new standards should
be developed which are more cost-effective and compatible with rural needs.
Administrative changes
As we have seen, the way towns allocate funds to infrastructure needs is basic to
their infrastructure problem. As long as the capital budget is considered only when some
money is left over after the operational budget is completed, there will be no
improvement. Capital planning and budgeting cannot be lumped together with
operational budgeting. Rather, the capital budget must be considered an on-going and
constant part of the budget allocation process.
The first step in carrying out this capital planning process is to inventory the
infrastructure assets in the community. Few communities have a comprehensive listing
of their assets. The town of Amesbury, for example, is now in the midst of developing its
first inventory of capital facilities since 1921.

A second critical step is an evaluation of these physical assets. The condition of
the facilities, their effectiveness, and future needs of the community, need to be
determined. The problem of leak detection for water and sewer systems is particularly
crucial. Many of these systems were built at the turn of the century and have become
outdated. The problem has become so severe that the State government is now willing to
pay 50% of the cost of leak detection and repair if the municipalities pay the remaining
half. Infrastructural systems must be evaluated if our increasingly scarce and costly
resources are to be protected (for an analysis of this problem, see Male et al., 1985, pp. 120).
The greatest need at the local level, in terms of the capital planning process, is the
formation of a capital improvement committee, staffed by knowledgeable citizens who
have the confidence of policy-makers, department heads and the public at large. Above
all, it should have a banker and a lawyer, for if a bond is required their services will be
invaluable. The reason for this is that the legal and financial process is extremely
complex. A person with legal experience and/or banking experience can ensure that the
process is carried out correctly and with a mind toward prudent investment. Very few of
our cities and towns have such organizations and even fewer have effective ones.
Other management innovations can enhance the development of capital planning
at the local level. If a town is fearful of floating a bond or spending capital to purchase a
piece of equipment then leasing may be an option. For example, the Town of Andover,
Massachusetts, recently sold its town hall and leased back space within it. The assets of
such an approach are several: (1) maintenance of the building is no longer a public
function; (2) the property, no longer a public building, is on the tax rolls, and (3) the city
has more cash in its coffers. The city of North Adams, Massachusetts is considering such
an option as a means of attracting a State courthouse: the city will buy a building,
renovate it, sell it to a developer and then guarantee the developer that the court will be a
tenant for ten years.
A second example is the development of mutual aid pacts on equipment.
Neighboring towns often invest in identical equipment that is not used more than
occasionally. Capital outlays would clearly go further by towns sharing the cost, use and
maintenance of such equipment. Most rural areas of Massachusetts participate in
regional school districts; this concept could be adapted for delivery of other public
services, such as highways, water supply, wastewater treatment, solid waste management.
State incentives should be made available to communities which pursue this approach.
A third example, and perhaps the most simple one, involves the setting of fees to
recover the cost of operation and maintenance of infrastructure systems from those who
use them. For example, if a new subdivision of 100 homes is to be connected to the local
sewer system, the cost should be borne by the developer and new residents.
State assistance to local governments must be provided if such innovations are to
be effected. One approach would be to develop the expertise of local officials through
university training programs in finance, planning, management, etc.

At the same time the administration of State and Federal grant programs can be
tailored to rural communities’ needs, for example by streamlining the guidelines and
application procedures for grant programs which in many cases are designed for urban
communities and their professional staffs. Grant programs for rural infrastructure
programs should be designed with volunteer governments in mind, with simplified
application requirements. ‘Circuit riders’ should be made available to provide technical
assistance. The term ‘circuit rider’ is used in Massachusetts for State paid experts in
local management who will travel between small towns to help the communities keep
their management systems in order. The program, at present, is quite small.
Most importantly, towns should consider hiring professional staff, perhaps with
assistance from high levels of government. Towns should also find ways to consolidate
often fragmented administrative structures currently dealing with capital improvements.
The need for statewide infrastructure and strategic planning
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts now recognizes the urgency of its
infrastructure problems, as evidenced by continuing, but as yet unsuccessful efforts to
pass legislation authorizing creation of the Massachusetts Infrastructure Bank
(‘MassBank’), which would finance both State and local infrastructure investments, and
act as a wholesaler for locally initiated infrastructure bonding. One of the factors
exacerbating Massachusetts’ infrastructure crisis is the complete lack of strategic or
growth management planning at the State level. Massachusetts is now the only State in
the north-east without a strategic planning office in State government. Consequently, at a
time when the State’s economy is rapidly expanding, there is no unit of government
responsible for assessing the cumulative impact of rapid industrial and residential
development on the natural resources, communities and infrastructure of Massachusetts.
Clearly what is required is effective strategic planning at the State level for
Massachusetts’ infrastructure needs.
A Strategic Planning or State Planning Office (or expansion of the role of the
existing Governor’s Office of Economic Development from its current short-range
planning responsibilities) could improve the coordination of various State agencies
engaged in infrastructure planning and investment, and could aid local governments in
their infrastructure planning. One immediate priority for such a new entity would be a
systematic Statewide assessment of infrastructure needs for individual communities,
regions and the Commonwealth as a whole. This effort should be carried out in
cooperation with local governments, given the strong role of municipalities (noted
earlier) in infrastructure planning and development. This effort should also be
coordinated with a Statewide effort to identify resource conservation priorities which
could be safeguarded through comprehensive planning for infrastructure investments.
The Commonwealth must recognize the inter-relationship between infrastructure
planning and growth management planning at the State and local level. Without this
function at the highest level in State government, Massachusetts will continue to suffer
from inadequate or outmoded infrastructure which will undercut needed economic

development efforts in some regions, while allowing inappropriate development in other
areas which may be in conflict with the Commonwealth’s resource conservation
objectives.
Conclusion
Rapid growth in rural Massachusetts communities has brought new pressures to
bear on their infrastructure systems. Small-town volunteer governments are ill-equipped
to plan for the design requirements and expense of infrastructure development.
Hampered by public reluctance to spend and their own lack of information, small-town
officials often end up ignoring the deterioration of their infrastructure altogether.
It must be recognized that the infrastructure needs of rural communities are
different from those in urban settings. Small-town officials must be helped to inventory
and evaluate their physical assets and identify local needs. They need to share expertise,
train volunteer administrators and use innovative techniques such as leasing, mutual aid
pacts, and fee-setting to reduce infrastructure costs. They must also adopt design and
engineering standards appropriate to rural areas and keep capital planning and budgeting
separate from operational budgeting.
Using such techniques, rural communities, both in Massachusetts and elsewhere
in the U.S.A. and overseas, can begin to gain some control over the condition of their
infrastructure. Perhaps most importantly, however, rural communities must work with
the State or higher level of government to make infrastructure planning an integral part of
the strategic growth management process.
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discussion of similar trends and problems elsewhere in the U.S. see Associated General Contractors of
America (1983) and Subcommittee on Economic Goals and Intergovernmental Policy (1984). For a
discussion of Britain’s infrastructure problems see Confederation of British Industry (1984) and
Department of Transport (1983).
3
For a review of the problems and opportunities facing the Commonwealth see Mullin and Thomas (1985).
4
This problem is discussed at some length in Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation (1984).
5
For a review of the characteristics of these towns see Dunwell (1978).
6
These problems are described and analyzed in Polenske et al. (1983).
7
For a discussion of the impact of this booming economy see Marsh (1986).
8
This problem, amongst others, is analyzed in the Governor’s Commission on the Future of Mature
Industries (1984).
9
Recent data collected on 17 cities and towns in Massachusetts shows that the trend is continuing. See
Armstrong et al. (1986).
10
This need is clearly delineated in the United States Conference of Mayors and the National League of
Cities (1983), see, for example, p. IV.

11

Data collected from our recent surveys shows that all seventeen cities and towns reviewed had the ability
to meet their infrastructure needs through bonds while staying below the State-imposed tax cap. See
Armstrong et al. (1986, pp. 28-29).
12
A by-product of this attitude is that new housing is being placed on larger lots. This means that buyers
have to be more affluent. In effect, the less willing a community is to provide modern infrastructural
improvements, the more likely this community is to be of the upper income class. See Hirsch (1983).
13
The Conservation Commission Movement gained increasing momentum in Massachusetts throughout the
late 1950s and early 1960s and ultimately became encoded in law in the late 1960s. For approximately a
decade the movement met its mandate with zeal. Now with the environmental crisis increasingly out of the
public eye, many of these commissions are becoming increasingly bureaucratic (interview with Andrew
Scheffey, conservationist and professor of regional planning, 29 January 1986).
14
For a further explanation see Wallace, Floyd, Ellenzweig, Moore Incorporated (1978).
15
For a review of how this management occurs see Floyd (1981). In particular see Chapter 29, ‘Land-use
Policy Issues’.
16
For an analysis of this problem as it relates to Cape Cod see the University of Massachusetts Department
of Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning (1985). The report was prepared for the New Alchemy
Institute.
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